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UPDATES IN ARKANSAS 
OIL & GAS LAW
Thomas A. Daily
Rec ent  De ve l o pme nt s  in Ar k a ns a s  Na t u r a l  Reso ur c es  La w
2014 Edi ti o n
By Thomas A. Daily1
Fo ur  a c t s  o f  th e 2013 Ar k an sa s  g e n e r a l  a s s e mb l y  a r e  o f  in ter est
In our last report, the 2013 Arkansas Legislative Session was about to expire, 
though it was then too early to assess the damage. Nowthat the dust has fully settled, 
let us review:
Act No. 1062 made certain amendments to existing statutes2 concerning the 
timing and method of the payment of royalties. Most importantly, the act increased from 
$100 to $150 the amount of royalty which may be accumulated over a period not 
exceeding twelve months. A royalty owner may decrease that amount to $50, upon 
written demand. Royalty up to $10 may be accumulated indefinitely except that it must 
be paid upon cessation of production or upon the payor’s relinquishment of 
responsibility for making the royalty payment. Also, the act expressly authorizes 
electronic payment of royalties and provides that required “check stub” information may 
be “made accessible in electronic form,” as an alternative to paper form.
Act No. 1299, titled the “Landowner Notification Act," amended Arkansas Code § 
15-72-203 to require a lengthy list of information to be provided to a surface owner prior
1 Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas: Adjunct Professor, University 
of Arkansas (Fayetteville) School of Law.
2 The amended code sections are Ark Code Ann §§ 15-72-305(a)(3)(A)(iii)(b), 15-72- 
305(a)(3)(B)(ii)(a), 15-72-305(a)(3)(5)(A), 15-74-601 (a) and (b) and 15-74-601.
to conducting “shale operations”3 upon that owner’s land. The Act requires the 
Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission to promulgate rules implementing the Act. The 
Commission did just that in amendments to its General Rule B-1, which now mirrors the 
Notification Act.
Act No. 1520 requires that ad valorem tax reappraisals of producing mineral 
interests occur annually, rather than every five years as under previous law. This act 
was inspired by the manner in which county tax assessors value producing minerals 
based upon previous production multiplied by an assumed price. Assessors were 
refusing to change the assumed price in the formula, even though the gas prices had 
fallen drastically, and relied upon the five-year reappraisal rule in the previous statute as 
authority for taking that somewhat unconscionable position.4
Act No. 262 was sponsored by Senator Maloch. That act amended ACA § 15- 
72-103(a)(1) to authorize a civil penalty of up to $100,000 per violation for illegally 
dumping or disposing of unauthorized fluids or substances into a well or upon a well 
site. The Oil and Gas Commission then amended its General Rule A-5 to reflect its new 
fining authority under the Act.
I come from relatively crime-free North Arkansas. I was unaware that illegal 
dumping into wells was a problem in the South-woods. Moreover, l  am totally unfamiliar 
with whatever incident(s) inspired this legislation. However, I know Senator Maloch to 
be one of the very best members of the General Assembly, particularly when oil and
3 As defined by the Act.
4Apparently at the direction of the state’s Department of Finance and Administration, 
Assessment Coordination Division.
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gas issues are involved, so I do not intend to argue with him.
I hope the 100-grand fine is an effective deterrent If not, perhaps the 2015 
Legislature can pass another law, authorizing pumpers to pack heat and placing a 
bounty upon dumpers brought in by pumpers, whether dead or alive.
Ar ka n s as  Supreme  Cou rt  Hold s  t h a t  Po ss es si o n  Un der  Unr ecorded Con tra ct  o f  
Sa l e  Constitu tes  “Ac tu a l  Not ice ” t o  Oil  and  Gas  Les see
Walls v. Humphries5 surprised me, to say the very least. Walls is the named 
Appellant, but the case is really about Hernandez, who was the purchaser of a tract of 
land under an unrecorded contract of sale. Hernendez alleged that he and his family 
were in possession of the land covered by that contract. However, the record owner of 
the land was one Humphries, who had sold it under the unrecorded contract. SEECO, 
Inc, which acted without actual knowledge of Hernandez’ interest, secured an oil and 
gas lease from Humphries. Paraclifta, also without knowledge of Hernandez’ interest, 
secured a mineral deed from Humphries.
The litigation which ensued involved Ark. Code Ann. § 14-15-404, which 
provides, in part:
No deed ...shall be good...against a subsequent purchaser of the real estate for a 
valuable consideration without actual notice thereof... unless the deed... is filed for
record...”6
Relying upon that statutory language, the trial court granted summary 
judgment, holding that SEECO and Paraclifta were innocent purchasers, not bound by 
Hernandez’ unrecorded interest The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed in Walls v.
52013 Ark 286, 2013 WL 3239042.
6Emphasis Added.
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Humphries.7 I applauded that decision in this presentation to the 2012 Natural 
Resources Law institute, concluding that it indicated a judicial limitation of the Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s holding in Killam v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp8 You may recall that in 
Killam, a mineral deed necessary to the Killams’ title was unrecorded, but another 
recorded deed, as well as tax assessments, provided clues to the existence of the 
Killams' interest. The court held in that case that Texas Oil and Gas had a duty, having 
seen those instruments, to discover the Killams’ interest. My reaction to the Court of 
Appeals opinion in Walls v. Humphries was that perhaps this duty to inquire was only 
triggered by other recorded instruments. While we would still have to live with Killam, 
nothing worse had happened.
But wait!! Remember what Yogi said about “when it’s over." The Arkansas 
Supreme Court accepted review of Walls v. Humphries on a totally unrelated issue and 
then proceeded to reverse the case’s principal holding. The Supreme Court ruled that 
the summary judgment was improper. If Hernandez’ possession was open, exclusive 
and notorious, it constituted “actual notice” under the recording act, trumping SEECO’s 
lease and Paraclifta’s mineral deed, even though neither SEECO nor Paraclifta had any 
knowledge about Hernandez. Whether Hernandez’ possession met that standard was 
an issue of fact.
I was amazed and disappointed by the court’s decision. I even commented on 
the Natural Resources Section’s listserv that the court was clearly wrong. I was quickly
72012 Ark. App. 4, 2012, 2012 WL 11458.
8 303 Ark. 547, 298 S.W.2d 419 (1990).
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corrected by Professors Norvell and Foster,9 who explained that I should have learned 
in law school that possession of land was notice to all the world-always had been. 
Research proved the professors to be right although most of the case law on this issue 
is pretty ancient.10
In its opinion, the court dealt with the issue as though it was determining 
whether SEECO and Paraclifta qualified as Bona Fide Purchasers for Value (BFP’s) of 
their interests. We know that BFP’s are purchasers for value, without notice of adverse 
interests. This is not really a BFP issue, because it involves the interpretation of a 
statute. Being inquisitive, I wondered if the word "actual” before "notice” in the statute, 
changed anything. Alas, it apparently does not.
For example, Black’s Law Dictionary contains a listing for the term “Actual 
Notice.” However, Black’s definition of “Actual Notice” is simply “See Notice.”11 
Moreover, the overwhelming weight of cases defining or explaining what is meant by 
“actual notice" of a fact explain that the term means either knowing that the fact exists or 
having available the tools to learn that the fact exists. In other words, “actual” preceding 
“notice” is as useless as the "p” in psoriasis.12 Then, to make matters worse, I learned 
that the Walls v. Humphries holding is not even unique to Arkansas. For example, in 
the Mississippi case of Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis13 an owner whose interest was 
unrecorded and whose “possession" was only through her tenant, prevailed over an oil
9 Real property law professors teaching at UAF and UALR Law Schools, respectively.
10 The most recent Arkansas case cited by the court for the premise that possession 
equals actual notice were decided in 1948. Most were decided before 1900.
11 Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
12 A condition which is likewise not particularly useful for much of anything except, 
perhaps, heartbreak.
13 201 Miss. 336, 29 So. 2d 100 (1947).
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Still, the fact remains that oil and gas companies, leasing in the middle of a lease 
play, have need to rely upon record title and seldom have the time or resources to 
check on possession. As you know, mineral owners do not even own the surface 
above. In those cases possession is clearly immaterial. Indeed, to those who drill in 
640 acre units for gas, all of the surface is immaterial, except that needed for well sites 
or pipelines.
How, as a practical matter, do you check possession in this day and age? Our 
society has become far more mobile. People do not just stay put any more. What if the 
owner is not home. How long must you wait for his return? Can you rely upon what the 
babysitter tells you? Perhaps it is time to understand that possession is not what it used 
to be when court houses were days away by horseback and conveyances were by 
livery of seisin.14
Understand, it is not the Supreme Court’s job to change the law to keep up with 
the times. That is a job for the Legislature. If this rule is to change, it will require a 
change to the recording act Merely substituting “actual knowledge" for “actual notice" 
would solve much of the oil and gas industry’s problem. Perhaps, that could be further
14 The seisin, as representing the freehold interest of the tenant, was at common law 
made use of for the purpose of a conveyance of such interest, the latter being in fact 
transferable only by a delivery of the possession of the land, called “livery of seisin.”
This livery of seisin was effected by the delivery on the land, “in name of seisin of the 
land,” of a turf or twig (livery in deed), or by a statement made in view of the land to the 
effect that possession was given, followed by entry by the alienee (livery in law). This 
ceremony was usually accompanied by a deed or charter “of feoffment,” as it was 
called, attesting the livery of seisin, and stating the purpose, nature, and extent of the 
transfer, the whole transaction being known as a “feoffment." (1 Tiffany Real Prop. §
22 (3d ed.) (citations omitted).
and gas lessee w ith no knowledge of the owner’s interest.
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improved by placing the burden of proving actual knowledge upon the party claiming 
through the unrecorded interest. Before we jump on that wagon we need to consider 
whether we might be creating more problems than we solve, but that is for another 
discussion. The bottom line here is that the decision in Waffs v. Humphries, while 
practically difficult to stomach, is based upon solid case precedent and unlikely to 
change except through legislation.
Ar k an s as  s u p r eme  Cou rt  Int erprets  a  Min e ra l  Deed  Con ve yi n g  an  Und iv id ed  
_____Int erest  as  Effe c tiv el y  Co nve ying  A ll  o f  Gr an t o r ’s Min e r a l  In te res t
Back in BC15 many conveyances were accomplished by fill-in-the-blanks forms.
A mineral buyer would simply tear a form from his pad, use a pen to fill in each blank in 
the form, procure the grantor’s signature, get that signature acknowledged, and record 
the deed. Barton Land Services. Inc. v. SEECO. Inc.16 dealt with one of those 
transactions, obviously left incomplete in haste. At issue was a 1929 mineral deed, left 
partially uncompleted as follows:
[R.F. Thomas and Amy Thomas]... do hereby grant bargain, sell and 
convey unto the said J.S. Martin Trustee and to his heirs and assigns
forever, an undivided____interest in and to all the oil, gas and other
minerals, in, under and upon the following described lands lying within the 
County of Van Buren and State of Arkansas, to-wit: [description of the 
three tracts] containing 221.35 acres, more or less.
The Thomases had owned 100% of the minerals beneath the lands described in 
the deed. The question for the court: What, if anything, goes into the open blank? 
Successors in interest to the grantor, including Barton Land Services, argued that 
leaving an essential term17 of the contract uncompleted caused the deed to be void for
15 Before computers.
162013 Ark. 231,___S.W.3d___ , 2013 WL 2361043 (2013).
17 The quantity of interest conveyed.
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vagueness. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed. Applying the presumption that a 
grantor who deeds without exception or reservation conveys his entire interest, the 
Court ruled that the uncompleted deed conveyed the grantors’ entire 100% interest to 
the deed’s grantee.
Two 2013 Arka n sa s  Cou rt  o f  Appea ls  Dec is ion s  
Vo id  Min e r a l  Qu ie t  Tit l e  Dec ree s
Those of us who examine title are frequently confronted by quiet title decrees 
purporting to confirm title to previously severed mineral interests in persons who never 
owned them. The claims of those mineral claimants are often based upon void tax 
deeds, and nearly always include a bogus allegation that the plaintiff has adversely 
possessed the severed interest.18 We have long treated these quiet title decrees as 
essentially worthless, much to the annoyance of the ‘Winners” in those lawsuits and 
their attorneys, who had charged good money to obtain the worthless court orders.
Now we have a couple of decisions of Arkansas’ Court of Appeals to back us up.
Wright v. Viele19 involved a 1991 decree purporting to quiet title to 100% of the 
minerals beneath a subject tract. The successors to a person named E. Graves, who 
were the owners 50% of that mineral interest, were not personally served in connection 
with the quiet title suit. Rather, they were "served” constructively, by published warning 
order. That warning order incorrectly referred to their predecessor’s name as “E. Crow.”
18 In Arkansas, as in most jurisdictions, adverse possession of a severed mineral 
interest can only be accomplished by actual production of the severed mineral, contrary 
to the rights of the true owner. (See Daily, Thomas A. and Barrier, W. Christopher, 
Well, Now, Ain’t that Just Fugacious!: A Basic Primer on Arkansas Oil and Gas Law, 
(hereinafter "Fugacious I") Ch. VIII, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 211 at 222-224.
192012 Ark. App. 471___ S.W.3d___ 2013 WL 4746668 (2013).
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Noting that constructive service is in derogation of the common law, the Court of 
Appeals stated that “statutory service requirements are strictly construed and 
compliance with them must be exact." Hence, the appeals court affirmed the trial 
court's decree voiding the 1991 decree.
In a similar holding in the second case, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed 
a trial court order upholding a 2009 quiet title decree. That case was Heirs o f Duncan v. 
Alfred T. Williams Living Trust.20 Mancil and Sylvia Duncan were residents of Tyler, 
Texas who owned land in Arkansas. When they sold that land to the predecessors of 
the Williams Trust in 1963, Mancil and Sylvia reserved a one-half mineral interest. In 
2009 the Williams Trust brought suit to quiet title to the Duncans' mineral interest. By 
then, both Mancil and Sylvia were deceased, but their heirs resided in the same family 
house in Tyler. The appeals court determined that counsel for the Williams Living Trust 
had not conducted the statutorily required diligent inquiry to locate the Duncan Heirs 
prior to attempting to constructively serve them by publication of a warning order. Had 
such an inquiry  been conducted, the Duncan Heirs likely could have been located and 
personally served with process. These decisions indicate that Arkansas’ appeals courts 
are willing to go behind the decrees in such suits to confirm compliance with statutory 
service requirements and fundamental due process.
Reas o n ab l e  Surf ace  Use b y  Oil  and  Gas  Lessee  is  No t  
Wrongful  and  The refore  is  No t  Com pe n sa b le
Pollard v. Seeco, In c21 was a surface damage case. SEECO, Inc. was 
the owner of an oil and gas lease executed by Pollard. Pollard had also executed a
20 2013 Ark. App. 740, 2013 WL 6565804 (2013).
21 2013 Ark. App. 331,___S.W.3d___ , 2013 WL 2099809.
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surface-use agreement with SEECO, for separate consideration.
However, after SEECO constructed a drilling pad upon lands which Pollard 
alleged were “part of the future development activity which had already been 
commenced...," Pollard sued for damages. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a 
summary judgment for SEECO, based, in part, upon an affidavit of a SEECO geologist 
stating that the well was drilled in conformance with industry standards, that it used an 
area of normal and reasonable size and that it was at a geologically desirable location. 
A mineral lessee who conducts surface operations is liable only if those operations are 
conducted unreasonably.
Pollard should not be interpreted as giving oil and gas companies license to run 
roughshod over surface owners. Arkansas follows the Reasonable Accommodation 
Doctrine with respect to conflicts between the surface and mineral estates.22 That 
doctrine concedes that the mineral owner (lessee)’s right of surface ingress exists, but 
requires it to be exercised with “due regard” to the interests of the surface owner. In 
Pollard, SEECO presented uncontroverted proof that it had complied with its duty to 
accommodate Pollard, and thus was not liable to him.
Un it ed  St at es  Dis t ri ct  Cou rt  Grants  Su mmar y  Jud g ment  t o  Lessee  in Lea se  
Can c e l l a t io n  Su it —Less ors  Fa il ed  t o  Give  Notic e  o f  Brea ch
In Lews v. Enerquest Oil and Gas. LLC23 the lessors sued Enerquest, the 
operator of the Chalybeat Springs Fieldwide Unit in Columbia County, seeking 
cancellation of their oil and gas leases, outside of producing formations based upon 
alleged violation of the Implied Covenant to Develop. The lessors’ primary contention 
22See Fugacious I, supra, at 224-228.
23 USDC (W.D. Ark., El Dorado Division) Case No. 12-CV-1067.
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was that Enerquest had failed to develop the Lower Smackover (Brown Dense) 
Formation. The United States District Court24 granted Summary Judgment to 
Enerquest holding the oil and gas leases required the lessors to give Enerquest notice 
of any alleged breach, together with an opportunity to cure the breach, prior to bringing 
suit. The lessors had contended that a prior request which some of them had made to 
the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, seeking dissolution of the unit, constituted the 
required notice. However, the court ruled that the request to the Commission was not 
made on behalf of all Plaintiffs, and, at any rate, was insufficient, because it requested 
dissolution of the unit, not development of the Brown Dense Formation.
Enerquest also attached a geologist’s affidavit to its summary judgment motion. 
In that affidavit Enerquest’s witness opined that a prudent operator in Enerquest’s 
position would not have explored the Brown Dense Formation, and that Enerquest had 
acted as a prudent operator as to other zones. The court declined to rule on that basis, 
however, stating that it was unnecessary for her to do so, given the summary judgment 
on the notice issue.
In case you are wondering, the district court’s decision on the notice issue does 
not conflict with Arkansas’ decision in Byrd v. Bradham25 The cases are 
distinguishable. In Byrd, it was contended by the defendant/lessee that principles of 
equity precluded lease cancellation without notice and the chance to cure. The 
Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that principal, in theory, but concluded that the 
non-development had gone on so long as to constitute abandonment of the leased
24 Hon. Susan Hickey.
25 280 Ark. 11, 329 S.W.2d 252 (1983).
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acreage by the lessee. Thus, notice was excused under the circumstances. In Lewis, 
on the other hand, the notice was required by an express lease provision, and 
Enerquest had done considerable work in the unit, so a finding of abandonment was 
improbable.
Th is  Jus t  In : Cour t  o f  Appea l s  Saves  Ch es apeak e ’s Go o s e (Pa r t ia l l y )
In a brand new decision, Chesapeake Exploration. LLC v. Whillock26 the 
Arkansas Court of Appeals partially reversed a summary judgment entered by a trial 
court27 which would have allowed the Whillocks to retain a lease bonus paid by 
Chesapeake on a mineral interest which they never owned. Here is what happened.
The Whillocks owned the surface of 80 acres in Van Buren County. They knew 
that they did not own the mineral rights. When a landman representing Chesapeake 
approached them for a lease on the tract, the Whillocks told him they owned no 
minerals, but, according to the Whillocks, the landman insisted, so eventually they 
executed a five-year lease and took his check for $120,000. The paid income taxes on 
the $120,000 bonus and spent the rest.
Fourteen months later Chesapeake saw a drilling title opinion which indicated 
that the Whillocks, indeed, owned only surface. Thus Chesapeake wrote to the 
Whillocks requesting refund of the bonus. That letter enclosed a release of the lease, 
which Chesapeake then recorded.
When the Whillocks failed to refund the bonus, Chesapeake sued, relying upon
26 2014 Ark. App. 55.
27 Hon. Michael Maggio.
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the warranty in the lease. There was just one problem. The lease had been released. 
Fortunately for Chesapeake, it alternatively sued for unjust enrichment. The Circuit 
Court granted the Whillocks’ motion for summary judgment ruling that the release of the 
lease was a general release of all claims.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, but only in part. The appeals court 
affirmed the summary judgment as to the breach-of-warranty claim. It reversed the 
judgment dismissing Chesapeake’s unjust enrichment claim, and remanded that part of 
the case for trial.
Chesapeake is far from home free. As the court observed, unjust enrichment is 
an equitable cause of action, subject to equitable defenses. Since the Whillocks 
claimed that Chesapeake should be barred by the equitable defenses of estoppel and 
misrepresentation the case was remanded to circuit court for trial on those issues. The 
Whillocks may have a home-field advantage there, considering that they spent the 
money in reliance upon the landman’s insistence.
13
